ABSTRACT In this paper, two systems for energy trading among energy prosumers are proposed: a buyerpricing-system (BPS), in which buyers determine the price of energy and a seller-pricing-system (SPS) in which sellers determine the price of energy. In order to analyze the BPS, the competition among buyers in the BPS is formulated as a strategic form game named energy-competition-game among buyers (ECG-AB). It is shown that the Nash equilibrium of the ECG-AB exists and furthermore is unique. Both systems are formulated by Stackelberg duopoly game model, and it is shown that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which implies that each system is stable. Now, in the SPS, it is shown that an equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg duopoly game model does not reduce social welfare. Thus, the analysis shows that the considered systems are stable and efficient. In order to corroborate the analysis, simulation is performed and numerical results validate the analysis; a full simulation code to simulate the proposed systems is available on GitHub.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the problem of greenhouse gas emission emerges as a global issue, the use of renewable energy is expanding globally. In this trend, renewable electric power is actually produced in many countries. Currently, renewable energy production is concentrated mostly on large-scale renewable power generation facilities, and energy production and consumption are separated. However, considering multiple factors such as the grid connection of large-scale renewable power sources, environment, and pricing, distributed renewable energy production and consumption are emerging as an alternative to centralized and concentrated renewable energy production, and the portion of such distributed renewable energy production and consumption is increasing [1] - [4] .
In order to efficiently and reliably operate and manage such complex distributed future power systems, microgrids are considered as an important component of the Smart Grid and a promising platform to integrate and coordinate many distributed energy sources such as photovoltaic cells, fuel cells, and other renewable energy sources [5] - [7] . In microgrids,
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customers not only consume energy but also produce energy (such customers are called energy prosumers), and hence consideration of this bilateral relationship among energy prosumers is necessary for microgrids. Thus, energy trading among energy prosumers instead of unilateral production and consumption is considered to regulate and balance energy generation and consumption in microgrids based on economics [8] . Energy prosumers involved in energy trading produce, store, and consume energy themselves, and should be able to supply energy to the geographic area without relying on the main grid in order to mitigate the overload of the main grid and to reduce transmission losses. Consumers in microgrids can reduce electricity cost through energy trading by improving the price competitiveness of distributed power sources, since the distributed power supply cost is decreasing due to the rapid progress of distributed power supply technology and the increased production scale [9] - [11] . When some prosumers have unnecessary energy and other consumers need more energy, it is advantageous for them to exchange energy instead of demanding energy from the main grid. In such energy exchange, a prosumer with extra energy is called a supplier or a seller, and a prosumer requiring energy is called a consumer or a buyer. Furthermore, energy trading is beneficial to mitigate the system stability degradation caused by inclusion of new renewable power suppliers.
Despite such promising aspects of energy trading in microgrids, it is not so simple to balance energy demand and supply in energy trading based on economics, since the generation of renewable energy and the energy consumption in microgrids are variable. Lots of research has been conducted on energy trading models in microgrids in order to make microgrids stable and independent from the main grid and to promote energy trading. As an initial study of energy trading in microgrids, [12] proposed a basic energy trading system in which all circumstances of prosumers are identical and each prosumer wants to maximize its own revenue. Thereafter, most energy trading studies works up to now are based on game theory, because each prosumer acts like a player. [13] - [30] chose game theoretical approach, and they can be roughly classified into three disciplines. Also there are many other papers with variations [31] - [37] .
The first group of studies [13] - [15] modeled the energy trading market as a double auction which is similar to the existing stock market. This type of energy trading model is hard to be applied to energy trading market which needs some time intervals to make energy trading. Another group of studies [16] , [17] modeled the market as a cooperative game such as Coalitional game to gain the overall benefit of the system. The limitations of this approach are high risk when a prosumer betrays cooperation, and difficulty to obtain a high profit. Finally, [18] - [27] modeled the market as non-cooperative game such as Stackelberg game, and repeated game [28] - [30] . As can be seen from the number of articles, the Stackelberg game is the most common model adopted in many energy trading in microgrids. The reason is that it is reasonable for each prosumer to take a strategy to maximize his or her own profit by dividing sellers and buyers into leader and follower. Among all of the above studies, only [19] deals with the model in which a buyer determines the price. However, since this study consider only one buyer with many sellers, there is a limitation in that it is very difficult to directly compare performance with other energy trading models in which there are many buyers.
To overcome limitations of previous research, this paper propose a new energy trading model in which there are many buyers not as price takers. Furthermore, another energy trading model is also proposed in which a seller determines the price of energy. Under the same situation, system managers can directly compare two proposed models and it would be a rationale for determining which system is to be adopted. The contributions of this work are the following:
• Two systems for energy trading among energy prosumers are proposed: a buyer-pricing-system (BPS) and a seller-pricing-system (SPS). In both systems, energy is allocated proportionally to bidding, and the utility of each prosumer is designed practically, considering the desired weight factors.
• In particular, the proposed buyer-centric BPS is an energy trading system in which buyers instead of the sellers determine the unit price of energy directly. In BPS, the competition among the buyers is formulated as a strategic form game, named energy-competitiongame among buyers (ECG-AB). It is shown that there exists unique Nash equilibrium (NE) in ECG-AB, and furthermore the NE solution can be obtained by a convex optimization problem. It is also shown that the dual optimal solution is the unit price of BPS, which is an interesting result in game theoretic approaches.
• Both of the proposed systems are formulated as Stackelberg duopoly game model; the seller roles as a leader in SPS, and the buyers role as a group of leaders in BPS. In each system, there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium and the overall flow to obtain the equilibrium is provided. Thus, both systems are stable.
• It is shown that the equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg duopoly in SPS does not reduce the social welfare, i.e., the total sum of buyers' utilities. That is, although each buyer chooses the strategy that maximizes its own revenue, this optimal strategy is the same as choosing a strategy that maximizes the whole system's revenue, and this implies that the proposed SPS is perfectly efficient.
• Mathematical and statistical analyses on both systems are provided, enabling direct comparison between them with a variety of perspectives such as utility, unit price, and distributed energy. Furthermore, a full simulation code to simulate the two systems is provided and available on GitHub [38] . From the analysis and the simulation code, the administrator of an energy trading system can directly test and compare the two systems: BPS and SPS. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First, the two proposed models, BPS and SPS, are explained in detail in Section II. In Section III and IV, mathematical analysis of BPS and SPS is presented using game theoretic approaches. In Section V, the two systems are compared. Numerical results are provided in Section VI, to validate the analysis, to investigate the inefficiency of NE for BPS, and to provide additional comparison for the two systems. Finally, the conclusion of this paper is provided in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, two energy trading systems are proposed to distribute energy proportional to the bidding of the prosumer in a microgrid, namely, BPS and SPS. An overall outline of the proposed system models is shown in Figure 1 , explained in details in the rest of this section. At a certain time, assume that there is a seller in the microgrid, a prosumer who has a surplus energy E(kWh), and he or she can sell energy to the main grid at a unit price p min ($/kWh). At this time, there are N buyers in the microgrid, B = {1, · · · , N }, prosumers who are likely to run out of energy; therefore, the seller intends to sell energy appropriately to these buyers for a higher price than p min .
Note that buyers can purchase electricity from the main grid at a given unit price p max ($/kWh), but of course, it is FIGURE 1. Overall outline of the proposed system models: BPS and SPS. much higher than p min ($/kWh). Thus, if the unit price of energy to be traded between buyer and sellers p trd is between p min and p max , that is, p min < p trd < p max , then the buyer and the sellers will benefit from trading with each other.
In this energy trading system, a principle of fairness will be assumed, namely, that a seller distributes energy proportionally to the amount of bidding of each buyer. Thus, the energy amount E k to be received by the kth buyer will be determined as follows:
where w k is the amount of money that player k is paying, and E s is the total amount of traded energy. Then, the buyers purchase energy from the seller at the same unit price. The unit price at which the deal is to be concluded would be calculated as follows:
A. PAYOFF FUNCTION OF BUYERS
In this subsection, the payoff function of each buyer is explained. In this study, the payoff function of each buyer is evaluated as the happiness that he gets by buying energy. Each buyer bids money and gets energy; the bidding leads to a decrease in the payoff, and the energy to be obtained leads to an increase in the payoff. To this end, the payoff function of the kth buyer is denoted by u k (w k ; w −k ), where w −k = (w j ) j∈B, j =k . Then, it can be calculated by subtracting the happiness of being paid by paying money, w k from the happiness of obtaining energy,
Now, the following assumptions for v k (E k ) are provided:
• The more energy the buyer receives, the more happiness he or she feels.
• Depending on the amount of energy required by each buyer, the rate of increase in happiness due to energy gain is different.
• Due to the law of marginal utility, the more energy is distributed, the lower the rate of increase in happiness. It is easily checked that a function that satisfies the first and the third condition is a strictly increasing concave function. A logarithm function satisfying these three assumptions can be expressed as:
Here, E 0,k is the initial quantity of the energy that the kth buyer has. The player needs a term to subtract for utility to be zero when it trades zero energy. Here, a k and b k are the demand weight factors of the kth buyer; they have the following two roles: 1) how large the exchange rate of energy and money is, and 2) how much the kth buyer desires energy.
B. PAYOFF FUNCTION OF SELLER
In the proposed systems, seller and buyer can change positions at any time. Thus, the seller also has a utility function similar to that of the buyers, which is
where
Here, E max and E s are the maximum amount of energy that can be sold and traded energy respectively. w is the amount of money that all the buyers pay the seller; and a s and b s are the factors having the same meaning as in a buyer's utility. The utility becomes zero when seller is payed zero and sells nothing.
C. BUYER-PRICING SYSTEM (BPS)
In this subsection, the trading procedures of BPS are described in details. In BPS, the buyer proceeds with an energy auction through the following procedure to obtain the seller's surplus energy. 1) First, each buyer informs the system manager that he or she will participate in this energy auction and how he or she desires energy. Here, the kth buyer's desire for energy is related to a k and b k , the craving factors; roughly, the higher a k and b k , the higher the desire for energy of the kth buyer. Also they notify the system manager the amount of their leftover energy E 0,k s.
2) The participating prosumer as a seller is informed all this information and determines the amount of energy to be sold, E s . 3) Next, the buyers also informed the other buyers' information and how much energy the seller wants to sell. Importantly, all the buyers are not allowed to confer to cooperate with each other; the buyers who do this cannot participate in the energy trading market forever. 4) Now, each buyer bids for energy; the bid price of the k-th buyer is denoted by w k . Here, the unit price is automatically determined as (2) 5) However, before the real transaction, the buyers will not purchase energy if the trading price is more expensive than the unit price of energy from the main grid, and the seller will not sell energy if the trading price is cheaper than the price of energy to the main grid. Thus, the last procedure is to check the following condition to make a real energy transaction between the seller and the buyers: p min < p trd < p max . In summary, the strategies of prosumers in BPS are given as follows:
• The seller's strategy: E s • The buyers' strategies: (w 1 , · · · , w |B| ) Here, note that the trading price p trd is determined by (2) . The amount of energy purchased by each buyer depends on the bids of all the other buyers. In other words, the buyers compete with each other for the seller's energy, which can be interpreted from a game theoretical viewpoint as discussed in the next section.
D. SELLER-PRICING SYSTEM (SPS)
In this subsection, the trading procedures of SPS are described. SPS is a slightly different system from BPS, in which p trd is given by seller instead of buyers. All the buyers in this system are price takers, so their strategy does not affect the unit price. A prosumer willing to sell its energy can decide quantity of energy to sell, and how much the unit price would be. In this model, a buyer's strategy is still making bids, but the amount of energy he or she wants to buy is the focus because the unit price is actually fixed by the energy provider. Of course, if the price is less than p min or greater than p max , no energy trading is conducted.
In summary, the strategies of prosumers in SPS are given as follows:
The difference between BPS and SPS is summarized in Table 1 .
With a little abusing of the notation u k (·) in (3), the utility of the kth player can be expressed as
in the situation given p trd . Note that under the system, each player does not need other players' information anymore because the strategies of other players do not affect his or her own utility. Therefore, w −k is not a variable of u k anymore.
III. ANALYSIS ON BUYER PRICING SYSTEM
In this section, competition among buyers in BPS is formulated as a strategic form game. Also, the competition between the seller and the set of buyers is formulated as a Stackelberg duopoly game. The existence and uniqueness of the NE of the strategic form game are seen when the strategy of the seller E s is fixed. Also, the methodology to find the exact NE solution is given by solving a convex optimization problem. Then the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the Stackelberg duopoly game can be obtained numerically. Furthermore, some useful corollaries about unit price and the optimal distributed energy of this system are provided.
A. ENERGY-COMPETITION-GAME AMONG BUYERS (ECG-AB)
In this subsection, the proposed energy competition among buyers with payoff functions is formulated as a strategic form game. Let G be a tuple of players (buyers), their strategic space, and their payoff functions, such that
Then, G is a non-cooperative continuous strategic form game, which will called by ECG-AB from now on. Next, the definition of the NE of ECG-AB is provided. 
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium (NE) of ECG-AB): An NE of ECG-AB G
= B, N k=1 [0, ∞), (u k ) k∈B ,, w bp −k ≥ u k w k , w bp −k , ∀w k ∈ [0, ∞). In
B. EXISTENCE AND UNIQUENESS OF A NE OF ECG-AB
In this subsection, the existence and uniqueness of the NE of ECG-AB are shown rigorously. To this end, this subsections starts with the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The following optimization problem has a unique primal optimal
Proof: The proof follows the similar argument of Johari [39] .
Since v k (·) is continuous, strictly concave and strictly increasing, so isv k (·). The domain is compact and convex set, the unique optimal solution E bp exists when the equality k∈B E bp k = E holds. So at least one E k > 0. Also the constraints are all linear, the following KKT optimality conditions are guaranteed when primal and dual vairables are optimal. i.e.
i.e. primal and dual optimal solutions satisfy the following equations.
Since at least one E * k is positive and 
Solve the equation (7) as follows.
Also solving equation (8) gives
Therefore, to show ρ bp E bp is a NE, it's enough to show ρ bp E bp instead of w bp k satisfies equation (9) or (10) . Also taking w bp = ρ bp E bp makes at least two components of w bp are positive by the previous claim.
By using the fact that s∈B E bp k = E, and with little calculation, it is easily checked that ρ bp E bp satisfies either (9) or (10) .
Theorem 1 suggests that the NE solution of ECG-AB is identical to the solution of the optimization problem constructed in Lemma 1. The following theorem will deal with the uniqueness of this NE solution.
Theorem 2 (Uniqueness of NE): NE of ECG-AB is unique.
Proof: Ifw if an NE of ECG-AB, thenĒ andρ are the optimal solutions of Lemma 1 wherē
Note thatw satisfies (9) and (10). Substitutew to variablesĒ andρ in (9) and (10) with above equations, then the equations are identical to equations (5) and (6), so thatĒ andρ satisfy KKT optimality conditions of the optimization problem in Lemma 1. The mapping E to w is one to one and the problem in Lemma 1 has a unique solution, NE of ECG-AB is unique.
C. SOME USEFUL COROLLARIES ON BPS
In this subsection, some useful corollaries of the unit price of BPS are provided. 
Proof: Corollary 1 and the condition (6) directly gives the criterion (11) .
Corollary 3 (Representation of E bp k in terms of p trd ):
Proof: It is easily derived from little calculation with (5), (6) and by corollary 1.
Corollary 4 (Unit price of BPS in terms of E): Let B is the set of indices with positive E bp k . Then
Proof: By corollary 1, it can be checked that ρ bp = p trd . Then from the equation (5),
D. SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM OF BPS
In this subsection, the overall flow to provide the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of BPS is summarized. In the game theoretic approach, the seller's strategy is the amount of traded energy E s , and the buyers' strategies are {w k } k∈B . Once the seller fixes his or her strategy E s , then what is left is the competition game of buyers, ECG-AB in subsection III-A. The buyers determine their actions (w 1 , · · · , w |B| ), which is the unique NE of ECG-AB. It means that the seller can predict (w 1 , · · · , w |B| ), and the situation becomes a Stackelberg duopoly game. Finally, the seller can decide the amount of E * s that maximizes his or her own utility value. The seller's utility under BPS is maximized numerically in section VI, which is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of BPS. Figure 2 summarizes procedure of BPS. 
IV. ANALYSIS ON SELLER PRICING SYSTEM
In this section, the competition between the seller and each buyers in SPS is formulated as a Stackelberg duopoly game. There is no competition among the buyers since all the buyers are price takers. Also, the existence and uniqueness of the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is shown.
A. MAXIMIZING EACH PLAYER'S UTILITY FOR GIVEN p trd
Let E sp k (p trd ) be the optimal solution to maximize the seller's own utility u k for given p trd . Then the following maximization problem solves the optimal strategy for each k'th player.
Problem 1: (Utility optimization problem for kth buyer in SPS):
arg max
Since u k (·) is a strictly concave function with unimodal, it is enough to find the solution of the following problems:
and E sp k = 0 when (13) gives negative E sp k . Thus,
Moreover, E (20) After collecting the results (18), (19) and (20), finally (16) is obtained. It is easily checked that this is increasing in p trd . Then using this result, the aggregate demand of energy is considered to find the seller's optimal strategy considering buyers. To this end, the aggregate demand of energy is defined. , E AD (p trd ) ).
Definition 2 (Aggregate demand of energy): The aggregate demand (AD) is the total demand for energy at a given time, and all players try to buy goods to the point where their utility is maximized. Thus, it can be defined as
E AD (p trd ) = k∈B E sp k (p trd ).
C. MAXIMIZING SOCIAL WELFARE FOR GIVEN p trd
In this subsection, it is shown that the equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg duopoly game in SPS does not reduce the social welfare, which is defined as the total sum of buyers' utilities. To this end, consider the following convex optimization problem maximizing social welfare, that is, the total sum of all the players' utilities for given p trd .
solve it similar way as lemma 1,
and this is slightly different from (11) from corollary VI. For each k, v k (E k ) − p trd E k is strictly concave and has its maximum at
Thus, the objective function is also a strictly concave function and has its maximum. If the possible amount of traded energy is large enough, all the players can get their best utility trading as much as E sp k (p trd ) and µ would be zero. That is, if
for each player k and there would be some energy left that would not be traded.
Corollary 6: For given p trd , if the seller pursues his or her maximum utility, then E
. It should be noted that if E AD exceeds E, then µ has to be positive to reduce the amount of energy traded for each player to fit within the constraint, while maintaining the social welfare as high as possible. In this case, E sw k (p trd ) < E sp k (p trd ) for every k. This means that each player may not actually be able to buy energy by E sp k (p trd ). Finally, the following property is obtained which means that the equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg duopoly game in SPS does not reduce the social welfare.
Proposition 1: For the optimal strategy of the seller,
Proof: By theorem 3, the optimal strategy of the seller is on the AD curve, and corollary 6 concludes the proof.
D. SUBGAME PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM OF SPS
In this subsection, the overall flow of getting the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of SPS is summarized. Once the seller's strategy (p trd , E s (p trd )) is given, each k'th buyer has its unique optimal strategy E k . If sufficient traded energy is supplied, then each buyer can get as much energy as he or she wants. Theorem 3 guarantees a sufficient energy supply. If the seller finds his or her optimal strategy (p * trd , E AD (p * trd )) considering buyers, then the buyers would find their unique optimal strategies (E * 1 , · · · , E * |B| ) and the energy will be distributed according to their strategies. It is checked that the optimal strategy of the seller (p * trd , E AD (p * trd )) is uniquely determined, and it is the subgame perfect equilibrium of SPS. Figure 3 summarizes procedure of SPS. Proposition 2 means that the unit price of energy trading in SPS is set higher than that in BPS, which is an intuitive result because buyers are just price-takers in SPS. That is, the system administrator can adjust the unit price of energy intentionally by choosing BPS or SPS rather than choosing the unit price itself. In the next section, the numerical results are analyzed for statistical tendency comparisons of the two systems.
V. COMPARISONS OF BPS & SPS

VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a Stackelberg game in BPS containing NE among buyers is solved numerically. Also this solution is compared to maximized social welfare, which is the maximized sum of the participating prosumers' utility. Furthermore, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a Stackelberg game in SPS is solved numerically. Note that the equilibrium gives maximized social welfare and there is no game among buyers. BPS is compared with that of SPS in terms of unit price and utility. All the simulation codes are provided in GitHub [38] .
From corollary 2 in BPS section and in SPS section give a common buying criterion,
For simplicity, let the left hand side a k b k /(1 + b k E 0,k ) be r k for all k. If p trd is determined, whether or not kth buyer will buy energy is determined by r k . For this reason, the buyers would be sorted in ascending order by r k .
BPS and SPS scenarios are simulated with five consumers and one seller, and throughout this section, these members are fixed with coefficients as follows. 
A. VALIDATION OF ANALYSIS FOR BPS
In this subsection, numerical examples are presented to verify the theorems and propositions for BPS proposed in Section III. First, Figure 4 shows the utility of the seller under BPS with respect to variation of traded energy E seller . The seller can maximize his or her utility when he or she sells 58.880 of energy. Simulating multiple times, it can be empirically concluded that the shape of each graph is always same. The seller's utility graph is unimodal and strictly concave, the buyer's mean utility graph is strictly increasing, and the unit price graph is strictly decreasing and convex. In this regard, Figure 5 , 6 and 7 are numerical examples when the energy of 58.880 is traded. Figure 5 is a numerical example to verify theorem 2 which provides the unique NE of ECG-AB. That is, each player's utility takes the maximum when he or she exactly choose the strategy of NE, while the other buyers' strategies are NE, that is,
FIGURE 6. Utility, Distributed energy E k , and payments w i of consumers when the amount of traded energy is optimal to maximize seller's utility (i.e., 58.880) under BPS.
FIGURE 7.
Utility of consumers when the amount of traded energy and the unit price (58.880 and 2.375, respectively) maximize the sum of utilities of buyers under BPS. Figure 6 shows r k , w k , E k and the utility of the kth player for all k ∈ B in BPS. Note that the unit price is obtained as 2.375, and r 1 = 1.090 < 2.375, so the first player buys nothing which verifies corollary 2. Here, the sum of utility of the buyers is 307.324.
B. INEFFICIENCY OF NE FOR BPS
In this subsection, the inefficiency of NE for BPS is defined for analysis. Figure 7 shows the utility of consumers with the same unit price and traded energy as in Figure 6 , when trading proceeds in the way that maximizes the social welfare of buyers, that is the sum of the utility of all the buyers. NE cannot guarantee the social welfare of buyers; rather, the buyers just pursue the maximization of their own personal profit. The maximized social welfare is 309.519, which is not a very large increase from 307.324. Here, 1 − 307.324/309.519 = 0.007 can be called inefficiency of NE. This inefficiency distribution follows a log-normal distribution with shape parameter (the standard deviation of the log of the distribution) σ = 0.901; location parameter m = −0.001, which is almost zero; and scale parameter(the median of the distribution) m = 0.014. Note that the general form of the probability density function of the lognormal distribution is
The mean and standard deviation of the real data set are 0.019 and 0.022 respectively. This result shows that the selfish choices to create NE do not significantly undermine social welfare. How the energy purchase behavior changes user by user is checked by equation (13):
This means that the derivative of the utility function of the k'th buyer is larger than zero, which implies that he or she is willing to buy more energy than E k until the derivative becomes zero. On the other hand, if a k b k /(1+b k (E k,0 +E k ) < p trd , the k'th player consumes less energy than E k to achieve the maximum utility. Since the users are arranged by r k , as seen in Figure 7 , some at the front buy less energy, and some at the back buy more energy.
C. VERIFICATION OF THEOREMS IN SPS
In Figure 9 , the aggregate demand curve is represented by the blue line; (p trd , E sp s (p trd )) by the green line regardless of energy demand, i.e., with an infinite energy demand; and VOLUME 7, 2019 (p trd , E sp s (p trd )) by the red dotted line under demand constraint. The green line is the middle part of equation (17) . Figure 10 shows the utility of the provider in the three curves in Figure 9 . That is, the curves in Figure 9 are the projected to the xy-plane in Figure 10 . Figures 11 and 12 are the projections of these curves to the yz-plane and xzplane, respectively. Note that the graph of equation (19) is a projection of the green curve to the xz-plane in Figure 10 . The seller's maximum utility is on the AD curve, (p sp s , E sp s ) = (2.915, 67.673) with the utility value of 146.553, which indicates that theorem 3 is true. Figure 13 is a numerical example to verify Proposition 1. It shows each user's utility when social welfare is maximized under the situation (p Figure 14 is a numerical example to verify Proposition 2. When the unit price is larger than 2.041, E AD (p s ) ≤ E sp s (p s ) and this cross point is shown at Figure 9 . Once the unit price makes E AD (p s ) ≤ E sp s (p s ) true, p s > 2.041 in this simulated case, the unit price under BPS is strictly lower than that under SPS for fixed amount of traded energy. Figures 15 and 16 show the tendency of utilities of prosumers in BPS and SPS situations, respectively. All the coefficients are generated from the same distribution as in case of Figure 8 , 1000 times independently. It is seen that BPS tends to increase the total utility of buyers and to decrease the utility of the seller, and that SPS tends to increase the former and to decrease the utility of seller. Through this simulation, system managers can decide which trading system is better suited to their environment. The simulation code is provided in GitHub, which allows a manager to implement an environment-specific simulation.
D. COMPARISON OF BPS & SPS
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, two systems for energy trading among energy prosumers were proposed, BPS and SPS. In the BPS, the buyers determine the prices instead of the sellers, and the competition among buyers is formulated as a strategic form game, named ECG-AB. The existence and the uniqueness of the NE of this game were shown rigorously. Next, in the SPS, the sellers determine the price of energy and the amount of traded energy. Both systems are formulated by Stackelberg duopoly game model, and it has been shown that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, which implies that each system is stable. In the SPS, it has shown that an equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg duopoly does not reduce the social welfare, meaning that the proposed SPS is efficient. In order to corroborate the analysis, simulation is performed and numerical results validate the analysis; full simulation codes were provided on GitHub to directly test and to compare the proposed two systems, BPS and SPS. Energy trading with many sellers and many buyers in microgrids and heterogeneous characteristics of different distributed resources can be studied as future works.
